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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~lARY

J. HO\YARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Corporation, and HORACE BYINGTON,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF 'l,HE CASE
This action arose out of an autombile accident which
occurred on October 19, 1951 in the vicinity of the bridge
over Red Creek on U. S. Highway 40, about 22 miles west
of Duchesne, Utah. On that date Francis A. Howard,
accompanied by his son, Allen Howard, was driving a
Willys Pickup truck in an easterly direction along said
highway. As the pickup truck crossed the bridge over
Red Creek, it struck the side of the bridge, continued on
up the highway 80 to 100 feet, and then suddenly veered
over onto the wrong side of the highway and in front of
the defendant's truck, which had been approaching said
point from the opposite direction.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The defendant's truck collided with the Jeep at a
point on defendant's side of the highway near the north
edge of the same. Francis A. Howard and Allen Howard
died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision.
This action is brought by Mary J. Howard, the wife of
Francis A. I-Ioward and mother of Allen Howard to
recover damages by reason of their death. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial judge directed
a verdict in favor of the defendant upon the ground that
plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case. It
is undisputed that there was no evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant before the pickup truck
collided with the side of the bridge and then came over
onto the defendant's side of the highway. The sole issue
presented by the appellant's brief is; Was the plaintiff
entitled, under the evidence, to have the case considered
by the jury upon the theory that the defendant had the
"last clear chance" to avoid the accident~ We will confine
our statement of facts and argument to that issue.
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
The highway in the vicinity of the accident runs in
a generally northwest and southeast direction. (Exhibits
1 Reproduced herein for the convenience of the court and
19). Red Creek bridge is located near the bottom of a
gully or ravine through which Red Creek flows (Exhibit
1 and 19). The road approaching the bridge from the
northwest is down hill at a grade of from 7.3% to 3.6%
in the vicinity of the bridge. The road approaching the
bridge from the southeast is down hill at a grade of
approximately 6%. Near the southeast end of the bridge,
2
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a dirt road intersects the highway on the south side
(Exhibit 1 and 19). Directly across the highway frmn
this dirt road is a wide turn out area (Exhibit 1). The
oiled surface of the highway is 22 feet wide (R. 35). The
bridge is somewhat narrower and is 20.4 feet wide (R.
35). \Y e have printed two views of the scene, taken sorne
months after the accident to acquaint the court with the
general scene. (See Exhibits SA & 11.)
On the south side of the bridge near the southeast
end were fresh scuff marks which appeared to have been
made by the tire of the Jeep scraping along the sides of
the bridge (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) (R. 31). Leading off the
southeast end of the bridge on the south shoulder of the
road, tire marks extended for a distance of about 75 to
90 feet where they veered off to the north side of the
highway (Exhibit 1, R. 35-36). A line made by some
liquid extended down the south side of the highway for
a distance of 100 feet where it suddenly turned across
the highway (R. 91-95). (See also Exhibits 2, 3, 6 & 7
printed here for the convenience of the court.) The point
of ilnpact was some 225 feet from the marks on the southeast side of the bridge (R. 32), near the north edge of the
traveled or oil surface of the highway (R. 26).
The defendant's truck was loaded with explosives
and was traveling northeast toward Salt Lake City. As it
approached the scene of the accident, it was traveling
-15 _miles per hour ( R. 41). After the impact, it came to
rest :25 feet off the north side of the highway 135 feet
from the point of impact (R. 24 & 25), in the turn out
area on the north side of the highway.

3
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The record is silent as to why the Jeep went out of
control and hit the south side of the bridge. There is no
evidence of the speed at which the Jeep was traveling as
it approached the bridge, unless we can infer that it was
going at a high rate of speed from the fact that it
apparently went out of control, struck the bridge and
then cut over on the wrong side of the highway. Nor was
there any evidence of what would have been a reasonable
speed or the speed limit on the highway.
The only eye witness to the accident was the driver
of defendant's vehicle, Horace Byington, who was not
called to testify. The driver told the patrolman, Glen
Wing, in substance that he observed the Jeep hit the
south side of the bridge and then continue on down the
highway (R. 29). He was supposed to have told Brady
Howard that it looked like the Jeep hit the corner of the
bridge and then went out of control and had cut crosswise across the highway and that he did not see it any
more until he felt the impact (R. 115).
Dr. Harris, an expert called by plaintiff, testified that
defendant's vehicle could have been brought to a stop
.;;tfter the brakes had been applied sufficiently to lay down
skid marks in 130 feet (R. 148); That the time it would
take an ordinary driver to apply his brakes after he
realized the danger would be % of the second, reaction
time, during which time the defendant's truck, at a speed
of 45 miles per hour, would have traveled an additional
50 feet, for a total of 180 fe_et (R. 150). Continuing on,
the doctor testified (R. 150):

"Q.

Of course, Doctor, in a situation, assuming,
-4
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Doctor, that the driver of this truck is coming
down that grade and sees ahead of him going
east, he is traveling 'vest, sees ahead of him
a jeep truck or a vehicle hit a bridge and go
out of control and travel along the shoulder
of the highway for son1e distance before it
suddenly cut over to his side of the road, in
addition to reaction time wouldn't you also
have perception tin1e? In other words,
wouldn't that person first have to see the
emergency which would take him the reaction
tiine that was there and then form a judgment
as to what he was going to do about it~
\Y ouldn 't you have that in there, too~
A.

You mean to take time for him to make up his
mind just what he wanted to do~

Q.

Yes. In other words, he would have his reaction time; it would take him the reaction
time to see the thing and realize what was
happening and then you would also have a
little more time for him to judge or perceive
what he was going to do about it~

A.

He might need time to do that, yes.

Q.

And if you have a judgment time it might be
two or three seconds~

A.

Well, he might not apply the brakes at all,
which might be many seconds.

Q.

In other words, if he had a large load of explosives and he sees the vehicle coming and
isn't sure which way it finally might go it
might take him two or three seconds to decide
what to do about it~

A.

It would take time. It might take him two or
three seconds.
5
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Q.

In other words you have what you would call
judgment time~

A.

1 would call it judgment time."

STArrEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I.
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOES NOT
APPLY TO A SITUATION WHERE THE OTHER PARTY'S
NEGLIGENCE OR CONDUCT CONTINUES UP TO THE
POINT OF IMP ACT.

POINT NO. II.
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE REQUIRED
A CLEAR OPPORTUNITY TO AVOID THE ACCIDENT.

POINT NO. III.
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE
CHANCE TO AVOID THE ACCIDENT.

A LAST

CLEAR

POINT NO. IV.
THERE IS NO SHOWING OF ANY NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOES NOT
APPLY TO A SITUATION WHERE THE OTHER PARTY'S
NEGLIGENCE OR CONDUCT CONTINUES UP TO THE
POINT OF IMPACT.

The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is only applicable
to a situation where the plaintiff's or injured person's
negligence has subjected himself to a risk of harm from
which he is unable to extricate himself by the exercise
of reasonable diligence and care. The Doctrine does not
apply to a situation where the defendant's negligence or
6
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conduct, which is a proximate cause of the accident con'
tinues up to the point of impact. The first requirement
of the Doctrine is whether, as stated by the restatement
of the Law of Torts \T ol. 2, Sec. 479, Page 1253:
'·a. The plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care and,"

In the case of Watkins v. Utah Poultry a.nd Farmers
Co-op, (Utah) 251 P 2d 663, where the court's failure to
instruct on last clear chance where plaintiff's car was
driven onto the wrong side of the highway was discussed,
the court said on Page 668 :
"Under the facts, there are just two possible
situations to which the above request could reasonably be considered to apply. The first would be
under the assumption that the plaintiff was keeping on his own side of the road. That circumstance is adequately covered by other instructions
advising the jury of the defendant's duty to travel
on its own side of the road and that failure to do
so would be negligence, which, coupled with proximate cause, would permit plaintiff to recover. The
other would be under the assumption that the
plaintiff came over onto the wrong side of the
road, and the plaintiff wanted the court to tell the
jury that even though he crossed over onto the
'vrong side of the highway, he could nevertheless
recover if the defendant saw or should have seen
him and thereafter in the exercise of reasonable
care he had a 'clear chance' to avoid the collision.
'rhis contention is answered by the analysis of
'last clear chance' as contained in the case of
Compton v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot
Company, where we approved the doctrine as set
forth in sections 479 and 480 of the Restatement
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of rrorts. In the instant case, the plaintiff's negligence would not have come to rest, and defendant's driver could not possibly have been aware
that plaintiff was inattentive; so at best, even
under plaintiff's theory and taking his interpretation of the evidence, we would have had the concurring negligence of the plaintiff and defendant
resulting in the collision, under which circumstances there could be no recovery."
In Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot CompOJI'Iiy,
(Utah) 235 P 2d 515 on Page 518, the court said:
"We have never held that a mere continuance
of the same inattentive negligence created a situation of inextricable peril. When the injured person's negligence has not come to rest, as it had in
the above case~, so that by the exercise of reasonable care she would have been able to avoid the
peril at any time up to the moment of injury, the
injury is then the result of the concurring negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. The one
was just as much the proximate cause as the other.
Ryan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P.
71. Harper on Torts, Sec. 139, Page 306, considers
the situation of the negligent defendant and the
negligent plaintiff where the defendant is unaware of plaintiff's peril and states: '* * * It
follows, thus, that the doctrine of last clear chance
does not include cases in which a plaintiff has the
physical and mental ability to avoid the risk up
to the moment of the harm. His "continuing"
negligence, as it is sometimes called, continues to
insulate the defendant's negligence, and the ordinary rule of contributory negligence governs the
case.'"
The evidence in this case shows that Francis A.
Howard, beginning at a point 80-100 feet from the point
8
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where he had collided with the bridge and 145-125 feet
from the point of impact, left the shoulder of the south
side of the highway and drove his jeep diagonally across
the highway into the path of the defendant's vehicle.
There can be no question that this conduct, either negligent or otherwise, was the proximate cause of his own
and his son's injury. At any ti1ne, up to almost the very
instant of impact, he could have avoided the collision by
remaining on his own proper side of the highway. We
are presented with a very fluid situation in which the
position of the two aut~mobiles was changing very rapidly from moment to moment. The deceased's conduct
never came to rest until the very instant of hnpact and,
since it continued up to that point, the doctrine of last
clear chance has no application to the facts of this case.

·I

POINT NO. II.
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE REQUIRED
TO A VOID THE ACCIDENT.

A CLEAR OPPORTUNITY

Before the doctrine of last clear chance can be invoked, it must appear that the defendant had a fair and a
clear opportunity to avoid the injury. In the recent case
of Cox v. Thompson, (Utah) 254 P 2d 1047, this court
said:
"The last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable
in the present instance. In order for the question
of last clear chance to be properly submitted to a
jury the evidence must be such as would in all
probability reasonahly support a finding that
there was a fair and clear opportunity, in the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid the injury. It
would not be sufficient that it appear from hind-

9
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sight that by some possible measure the defendant
by the 'skin of his teeth' could have avoided the
injury. See Morby v. Rogers, (Utah) 252 P 2d
231.
"This court has adopted as a rule in this state
the la:::;t clear chance doctrine of Sections 479 and
480 of the Restatement of Torts. See Compton et
al v. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Co., supra. Section 480 reads:
" 'A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance could have observed the danger
created by the defendant's negligence in time to
have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but
only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff's
situation, and (b) realized or had reason to realize
that the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore
unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the
harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.'

* * * *
"Thus the matter was properly withheld from
the jury if the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff was
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b)
inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril in
time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant was
thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing
ability to avoid harming decedent."
As was said in Compton v. Ogden Union Railway &
Depot Co., (Utah) 235 P 2d 515:

10
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''The rule approved by this court where plaintiff is negligently inattentive and has subjected
hin1self to risk of harm as provided in Section 480
is that he can recover from a defendant who lmew
of his situation and realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff is inattentive, and unlikely to'
disron'r his peril in time to avoid harm, and thereafter is negligent in failing to use ordinary care
with the means at his disposal to avoid harming
hin1. For the rule to be otherwise, we would again
only have the negligence of the plaintiff and defendant concurring together to proximately cause
the injury. * * *
"In the principal case in order for plaintiffs
to make out a case of last clear chance, it would
have been necessary that the defendant know that
decedent was in a position of peril, and in addition
have realized or had reason to realize that decedent was inattentive and unlikely to discover
her peril in time to avoid the threatened harm,
and defendant must thereafter have fa,iled to exercise reasonable· care in connection with its then
existing ability to avoid harming decedent."
(Italics ours)
Not only must the evidence show that the defendant
had an opportunity to avoid the accident after he becomes or has reason to be aware of plaintiff's negligence,
but the opportunity must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The case of Graham v. Johnson, 166 Pac. (2d) 230,
109 Utah 346, involved the opportunity of a defendant
to avoid injury to a thirteen year old boy playing ball in
the street. The court said:
""'' * * But in the last clear chance doctrine
11
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the word 'clear' has significance. In a case such
as this when both parties are more or less rapidly
changing their positions the evidence must be clear
and convincing that the party whom it is claimed
could have avoided the accident had a 'clear'
chance to do so.
"One should not be held liable for failing to
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a situation where it is speculative as to whether he was
afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In a situation where both parties are on the move the significance of the word 'clear' is most important.
Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding the
effect of one's negligence on a party not negligent. That party's negligence only arises when
it is definitely established that there was ample
time and opportunity to avoid the accident which
was not taken advantage of."
POINT NO. III.
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE
CHANCE TO A VOID THE ACCIDENT.

A LAST CLEAR

Appellant's argument that the defendant driver could
have avoided the accident is pure speculation and is not
based on any facts which are supported by the evidence
in this case, or any presumption of law, which may apply.
In making certain mathematical calculations which appear in their brief they admittedly, without any basis,
ask the court to assume that the vehicle driven by Francis
Howard was traveling at a speed of 45 miles per hour
at the time it struck the bridge abutment. There is no direct evidence of the speed at which the vehicle was traveling, nor is there any evidence of what would have been
a reasonable speed limit in this area, if we presume that

12
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the Jeep was being driven at a reasonable speed. An
inference that the Jeep was traveling at a high rate of
speed may be drawn from the fact that Francis A. Howard had so little control of his vehicle that he permitted
the same to first strike the side of the bridge and then
yeered on over onto the wrong side of the road. In the face
of such evidence, the presumption that he was exercising
due care disappears fron1 this case, for as was said in
Cox v. Thompson, supra:
"If the presumption that a person in a place
of danger exercises due care for his own safety
applies in this case, it will be extinguished if the
evidence properly sustains the finding that the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law."

~

at

Of course, if the Jeep were being driven at a high
and excessive rate of speed, there can be no question that
the Jeep would cover the distance between the point
where it cut across the road and the point of impact so
quickly that the defendant would have no opportunity
to avoid striking the Jeep.
Even if we presume that the vehicle driven by Francis A. Howard was traveling at a reasonable speed, such
a presumption does not support an assumption that he
was traveling at a rate of 45 miles per hour, the assumption on which all of the defendant's mathematical computations are based. Since the collision occurred on an open
road in an area outside any municipality or town, it would
ordinarily be governed by the State's speed limit of 60
miles per hour, which is defined by statutes as prima
facie reasonable. If we are to engage in unwarranted as-

13
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sumptions and speculation, it is as reasonable to assume
that the Jeep was traveling at a speed of 60 miles per
hour, or any other speed, as it is to assume that the Jeep
was traveling 45 miles per hour; and it is submitted that
we cannot arbitrarily, in the absence of any evidence,
make any assumptions which are not warranted by the
evidence and then use the assumed facts as a basis for
certain mathematical calculations in arriving at a decision in this matter.
The vehicle driven by Francis A. Howard and that
of the defendant were approaching each other from opposite directions. The rate at which the distance of which
the two vehicles was closing would be the combined rate
of speed of the two vehicles. To illustrate; if the vehicles
were both traveling 45 miles per hour, the distance between them would be reduced at the rate of 90 miles per
hour, or 132 feet per second. If one were traveling 60 and
the other 45, the distance between them would be reduced
at the rate of 159 feet per second. The evidence shows
that the two vehicles were at the most only 125-150 feet
apart at the time the Jeep cut from its side of the road
over onto the path of the defendant's vehicle. At the
rate the distance was closing between the two automobiles, if the Jeep was traveling at any speed at all, there
was available to the defendant only a second or two in
which he might have stopped his automobile or otherwise
acted to avoid the collision.
Not only are the mathematical computations cited
by the appellant based on assumptions which were not
warranted by the evidence, but they also ignore the fact

14
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that the Jeep remained on it8 own side of the highway for
a distance of fr01n ~U-100 feet after crossing the bridge,
and prior to c01ning diagonally across the highway to the
point of impact. The driver of the defendant's car would
have been entitled to assmnP that Francis A. Howard
would remain on his own side of the highway until it becarne apparent that he would not do so. At least, it cannot be reasonably said that he had a duty to make a
violent application of his brakes, or take any other drastic action to avoid a collision, until such conduct became
apparent. Therefore, it is misleading to say that the defendant driver had the time that it would have taken the
Jeep pickup to travel 225 feet at whatever speed it was
traveling, in which to detennine and execute a course of
action. The time would be that tin1e it would require the
Jeep to travel 120-145 feet. Returning again to the table
and illustrations cited by the appellant, it would only require the Jeep moving at a speed of 45 miles per hour less
than two seconds to travel 120 feet at -±5 miles per hour,
and about 2.2 seconds to travel145 feet. At 60 miles per
hour, this distance would have been covered in less than
2 seconds. This means that the defendant barely had
sufficient ti1ne to appraise the situation, and does not give
him time to apply the brakes and bring his vehicle to a
stop.
In terms of distance, the defendant's truck, traveling
at the same speed as the assumed speed of the Jeep, that
is 45 miles per hour, would be the same distance from the
point of impact as the Jeep, 145-120 feet, which under the
evidence would not give him the 180 feet which it was
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testified it would require for him to bring his vehicle to
a stop.
Nor should the court overlook the testimony of Dr.
Harris to the effect that in a situation such as faced the
defendant driver in this case, the defendant would need
two or three seconds in which to appraise the situation
and to determine upon a cause of action in addition to
what is termed reaction time. This is not the simple situation in which a driver suddenly finds an obstacle in his
path. In such a situation, the driver may be able to react
immediately. In this case the defendant driver had to
first determine the course the other vehicle would take
before he himself could decide what to do about it. What
may have appeared to have been the wisest course had
the Jeep remained on its own side of the highway may
not so have appeared when the Jeep cut over onto the
wrong side of the highway. While there may be a question in some situations as to whether a driver would require any time to appraise the situation, judgment time,
there can be no such question here.
To state the proposition differently, the defendant
driver in this case could not have been expected to act to
prevent the collision until such time as it became apparent to him what course the Jeep was going to take and
until it came over onto his side of the road. Even under
the assumptions engaged in by the plaintiff, the defendant had no clear opportunity to avoid the collision. The
plain and simple fact is that we have two vehicles approaching each other from opposite directions on a twolane highway. The driver of one of the vehicles for some
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unknown reason suddenly lost control of his automobile
and turned directly into the path of the other on-coming
vehicle. This aet ion and this alone was the proximate
cause of the collision.
The last clear chance is an opportunity which is
available to the defendant, and in order to judge that opportunity, we must place ourselves in the position of defendant driver as he can1e downhill on that fateful day
of October 19, 1951, toward the Red Creek bridge. As
he approached the bridge, the pickup truck, driven by
Francis A. Howard, approached the bridge from the
opposite direction. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we rnay assume that there was nothing about
the way in which the pickup truck was driven to put
the defendant driver on notice of any pending disaster.
The pickup truck reached the bridge first and upon crossing the same, struck the side of the bridge, but continued
off the bridge and on up the highway on its own side of
the road for a period of 80-100 feet. The defendant
driver, and we must keep in mind that he was handling
a truck loaded with explosives which required the utmost
of care on his part for his own safety and the safety of
others on the highway, was entitled to assume that the
pickup truck would remain on its own side and was not
required to rnake a violent application of brakes, thereby
endangering himself and Francis and Allen Howard; that
is, if he had time to apply his brakes, which appears extremely doubtful. As the pickup truck cut diagonally
across the highway, the defendant was faced with a
number of questions and decisions. Would the driver
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of the pickup truck turn back in to his own side of the
highway 1 Would he pass in front of the defendant's
truck and off the highway~ Should he turn his truck
to the left and onto the wrong side of the highway, and if
he did, would the pickup truck cut back to that side of
the highway1 Should he apply his brakes and attempt
to stop his vehicle¥ Should he turn to the right and attempt to avoid the pickup~
All of these questions and his course of conduct had
to be resolved within the time it took the pickup truck to
travel from the point where it first crossed over onto the
north side of the road to the point of impact. And, it is
apparent at that point, there was nothing the defendant
driver could have done to avoid the accident.
Looking back at the accident, and having the advantage of knowing what course the Jeep did pursue to the
point of impact, it is easy for us now to theorize that the
defendant driver may have done something which he did
not do to avoid the accident. Whether such course of conduct would have avoided the accident still remains in
the field of speculation. There is no evidence in this case
that the defendant driver had had any opportunity to
avoid the accident after he became aware of the position
of peril which Francis A. Howard and Allen Howard
had been placed in by the conduct of Francis A. Howard.
It is not for us now to engage in certain unwarranted assumptions to make it appear that the defendant by hindsight could have avoided the collision, nor is it proper to
place upon the defendant the burden of showing from
the evidence that he could not have avoided the collision,
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when it does not appear fr01n any evidence in the case,
no matter how '"e construe it, that he could have avoided
the collision.
POINT NO. IV.
THERE IS NO SHOWING OF ANY NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT.
~lueh
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of the brief of the appellant is devoted to his
discussion of the duty of the defendant to turn his automobile to the right, stop his automobile, or otherwise act
to avoid the collision. It is not contended that if the defendant driver had had a cl~ar opportunity to have avoided this accident by any reasonable course of conduct that
he should be excused from his failure to do so. The plain
and simple fact is that the evidence fails to disclose anything which the defendant might have done in the time
that he had to act which would have avoided the accident.
The physical evidence shows that the defendant did not
deliberately or heedlessly drive his vehicle into that
driven by Francis A. Howard. On the contrary, the evidence shows that even within the limited time available,
he had attempted to avoid the collision with the Howard
vehicle.
The point of impact between the two vehicles was
near the north edge of the oiled portion of the highway
(R. 26). The right wheels of the defendant's vehicle left
the oiled portion of the highway at about the point of impact and traveled along the north shoulder of the highway, the entire vehicle eventually passing off the oiled
surface and coming to rest about 25 feet off the highway
(R. 25). This indicates that · the driver had already
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turned his vehicle to the right at the time of the impact.
It is also the evidence that the defendant's vehicle was
brought to a stop within a distance of 135 feet, (R. 25)
and l<·ft marks on the north shoulder indicating the application of brakes. Applying the formula that it would
take a total of 180 feet, including reaction time, to stop the
defendant's vehicle and 130 feet after the application of
brakes, it would appear that the defendant had already
determined to apply his brakes, and applied them at about
the point of impact. Of course, after leaving the highway,
defendant's vehicle did pass over some boulders which
may have had some effect in slowing the vehicle. But,
the evidence does indicate that the defendant driver was
doing his best within the time available to avoid the
accident by applying his brakes and turning to the right.
Of course, it may be that if the defendant had determined on some other course of action, he may have
avoided the accident. This is entirely speculative, but
even should we determine that such is the case, the defendant would not necessarily be negligent for not taking
such a course of action. A person suddenly confronted
with unexpected danger is only expected to use such
means for avoiding that danger as would appeal to a
person of ordinary prudence in a similar situation. As
long as he acts 'as a reasonable and prudent person, he is
not obligated to choose that particular course of action
which would have avoided the accident. We must remember that looking back at an accident, it may be possible to outline a course of conduct which it may appear
would have avoided the accident. But, the person who is
20
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confronted with the danger at the time of the accident
does not have the opportunity for calm reflective thinking upon the subject. He n1ust deter1nine smne course
of action instantaneously. .Moreover, in looking back at
the accident, we have the advantage of seeing what the
other driver actually did, whereas the person confronted
with the situation must predict the other driver's actions.
The appellant now arg·ues that had the defendant driver
driven the truck 5 or 6 feet to the left, he could have
avoided the accident. There is no showing that the defendant had sufficient time to make such a maneuver in
the first place. In the second place, the pickup truck was
coming toward his truck from the left side of the vehicle
and it only appears reasonable that he should move to
the right, rather than to the left in order to escape the
collision. In the third place, the defendant driver could
not anticipate that Francis A. Howard would not return
to his own side of the highway, but may have expected
him to do so. Of course, if Francis A. Howard had returned to his own side of the highway, then the defendant, had he turned to the left, would have made the accident a certainty.
In the case of lJ!lorrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 130, the
defendant observed another vehicle approaching his vehicle on the wrong side of the highway at a distance of
about 225 feet. Both vehicles were approaching each
other at a speed of 35-40 miles per hour. The defendant
turned his vehicle to the left, in order to avoid the collision; at about the same time, the plaintiff returned to his
own side of the road. The two cars collided head-on on
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the plaintiff's side of the road.
In its opinion the court quoted with approval McPhee v. Lavin, 183 (Calif.) 264-191 P 23, as follows:
"One suddenly confronted with an unexepcted
danger may use such means for avoiding the danger as would appeal to a person of ordinary prudence in a like situation without being held to
strict accountability as to whether the course
chosen is the most judicious or not."
As stated by Blashfield in Cyclopedia of Automo..
bile Law and Practice, Vol. 1 Part 2, Page 553:
"When two alternatives are presented to a
traveler on a highway as means of escape from a
collision, either of which might fairly be chosen
by a reasonably prudent person, the law will not
hold him guilty of negligence in taking either, even
though he does not make the wiser choice, especially where there is only time for instinctive action, since he is not bound to use an infallible judgment as to the course to pursue to avoid a collision, but only to exercise that degree of care which
an ordinary prudent person would have taken."
The evidence in this case fails to disclose that the
driver of the defendant's truck failed to do anything in
the limited time available which might reasonably have
been expected of him to avoid the collision in this case.
In fact, the evidence discloses that he did everything within his power to avoid the collision.
CONCLUSION
The sole proximate cause of the accident out of which
this action arose was that the Jeep driven by Francis
A. I-Ioward for some unexplained reason collided with the
22
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side of the bridg-e and then cut ovPr onto the wrong side
of the highway into the path of defendant's vehicle. The
whole sequence of the accident occurred over the 1natter
of a Yery few seconds. After striking the bridge, the
Jeep continued on do·wn the shoulder on its proper side
of the highway for eighty to a hundred feet where it cut
across the highway 143 to 125 feet where the impact occurred. Frmn the tin1e the Jeep hit the bridge Ul;ltil the
Jeep cut across the highway, the defendant driver was
entitled to assu1ne the Jeep would remain on its proper
side of the road. He could not have been expected to anticipate that it would suddenly cut over onto the wrong
side of the highway, and until it did so, could not frame
a course of conduct upon that premise.
Yiewing the facts upon any theory, there is no showing that the defendant driver had a clear opportunity
to avoid the collision. The defendant driver turned his
vehicle to the right and brought his vehicle, which had
been traveling at 45 n;tiles per hour, to a stop within 135
feet from the point of impact, indicating that he did
everything within his power and which might reasonably
be expected of him to avoid the collision.
Appellant in his brief theorizes on what the defendant Inay have failed to do to avoid the accident. His argument is based on speculation and conjecture, assumes
facts which are not in the evidence, and eli1ninates other
facts which are in the evidence and must be taken into
account.
Perhaps the best summation is that given by the
Trial Judge in directing a verdict in favor of defendant:
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"THE COURT: Ladies and gentlernen of the
jury, the attorneys for the defendants in this case
have made a motion at the end of the plaintiff's
case for a dismissal and they make the motion that
there has been no showing that the truck driver
was guilty of any act of negligence upon his part.
And we do have in this State a doctrine of what is
known as the last clear chance. In other words,
as I explained to you the other day, if the plaintiff
himself, like 1\ir. Howard, is guilty of contributory
negligence he cannot recover. Of course that
doesn't apply to the boy who was riding with him
as a guest because he isn't chargeable with Mr.
Howard, Sr.'s negligence, but in order to hold the
defendants in this case the plaintiff has the burden of proof of showing that Mr. Byington did
something, or failed to do something, that a reasonably prudent man would have or would not
have done, and I think the evidence is quite clear
that under the circumstances here this thing happened so fast and under such conditions that Mr.
Byington didn't have any opportunity to do anything different than what he did do and that he
didn't fail to do something that a reasonably prudent man could have done.
"Now these are unfortunate things and, of
course, these obligations come to you and they
come to me, but I have seen fit that at this stage
of the proceeding I ought not to waste your time
or the time of these litigants in further proceeding
with this case because I am satisfied that the
plaintiff, unfortunate as this situation is and
tragic as it is, has not made in law what would
amount to a responsibility on the part of Mr. Byington.
"Of course, Mr. Byington being the driver of
24
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the truck, he is the one we look to see what he
should have done or didn't do and the Ringsby
people they would only be liable if Mr. Byington
is liable. So far as Ringsby is concerned we only
impute the negligence of Mr. Byington, if any,
to them and I am satisfied that there is not here
in the law sufficient to submit to you for your
deliberation and for that reason I have decided
that I am required as a part of rny duty to grant
this motion that the defendants have made and,
that being the case, the motion is granted and your
services won't be further needed in this matter
and I want to thank you for your attention here
and you will be excused until you are called again
in another case. The court will be in recess."
Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANSON,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
EDWIN B. CANNON
REX J. HANSON
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, Jr.
DON J. HANSON
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